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Peter van Inwagen’s essay, “Causation and the Mental,” offers a striking solution to Jaegwon Kim’s puzzle for non-reductive materialists about
mental events/states and mental causation: the solution, reminiscent of
van Inwagen’s solution in Material Beings to certain puzzles surrounding constitution/composition, is that there are no such things as events or
causation, and a fortiori no such things as mental events or mental causation, and hence nothing that can raise any puzzle. (More precisely, the
claim is that causation, and a fortiori, mental causation, is never instantiated.) This is no ad hoc reply, but rather a consequence of van Inwagen’s
very general ontological claim that everything is either a substance or a
relation; thus, there are no events and no causation, since the latter is a
relation that holds between events if it holds at all. (Van Inwagen does
not deny that there are true causal explanations, but the truth of these,
he argues, does not require that there are any events.) Van Inwagen has
demonstrated one advantage of denying the existence of events, namely
that doing so allows one to avoid a certain puzzle one might otherwise
have to confront. I suppose that could be taken as a reason to deny the
existence of events. Even if it is such a reason, it has to be weighed against
all the difficulties involved in such a denial. In any case, van Inwagen’s
ambitions are more modest: he is merely noting that Kim’s puzzle presupposes an ontology that one need not endorse, and that van Inwagen
rejects on independent grounds.
The volume is rounded out by two other pieces: an excellent editorial
introduction and a moving and informative appreciation of Plantinga’s
philosophical contributions, delivered by his long-time friend and colleague, Nicholas Wolterstorff. The former provides an overarching
framework for the volume, and the latter drives home the significance of
Plantinga’s achievements, especially for those of us who weren’t around
in the “balmy days of positivism.” All in all, this high-caliber volume is a
fitting tribute to one of our greatest philosophers.

Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, by William Hasker. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013. 269 pages. $99.00 (cloth)
DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington University
William Hasker writes: “The ‘three-in-oneness’ problem of the Trinity is
really hard” (162). I couldn’t agree more. Appropriately for a treatise on
that problem, Hasker divides his attempt at a solution into three parts:
Trinitarian Foundations, Trinitarian Options, and Trinitarian Construction.
Throughout, Hasker pushes something he calls “Social Trinitarianism.”
pp. 106–115
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Part I selectively skims the Fathers on the Trinity, focusing on Gregory of
Nyssa, Augustine, and a couple of other “pro-Nicenes.” Part II critiques
Barth, Rahner, Moltmann, Zizioulas, Leftow, van Inwagen, Brower and
Rea, Craig, Swinburne, and Yandell. Notably, in Chapters 15 and 16,
Hasker affirms absolute identity as the only relation whereby anyone can
count anything.
I expect that most readers of this journal will be most interested in Part
III, where Hasker develops his own syncretistic metaphysics of the Trinity,
drawing mainly on Leftow and Craig. Chapter 21, on methodology, tells
us that he aims to theorize about “the divine three-in-oneness” so that
he can “bring us a step closer to comprehending that mysterious reality”
(167). Such theorizing requires some constraints, however, chiefly “accepting the language of trinitarian belief with its limitations,” “in particular its
analogical character” (170). This implies, he says, that we should “exercise
restraint in our attempts to formalize this language” and in our use of it
“in the construction of systematic deductive arguments” (170).
Hasker is right. It is wise to treat analogical trinitarian discourse as
analogical, and so it is wise to exercise restraint with respect to it in these
ways. However, we must not forget a corollary to this sage piece of advice: it is foolish to treat non-analogical trinitarian discourse as analogical,
including the statements of a metaphysical theory aimed at solving the
three-in-one-ness problem. Imagine meeting a metaphysician who insists
that we count only by absolute identity and who gives a metaphysical
theory aimed at solving the three-in-one-ness problem. Suppose we find
among its statements these three: there is exactly one divine being, there
are exactly three divine persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,
and there is exactly one way to be divine. I would think that, no matter
what other learned erudition and metaphysical bells and whistles attends
the theory, we should construct a systematic deductive argument to show
that these statements entail a contradiction. If the author complains that
we’re taking them strictly and literally when she intended them analogically, we should counsel her to find another job, one more suitable to her
aspirations, e.g., trinitarian narrative, poetry, or liturgy, all worthy tasks.
Metaphysicians have a different task to perform and a different standard
to live up to in its performance: to state the cold, sober truth, and to do so
strictly and literally, in a rigorous, scrupulously well-defined fashion.
Chapter 22, ostensibly about monotheism, summarizes some of Larry
Hurtado’s views regarding the early church’s “binitarian practice.” Chapter 23 insists that each Person is God, where “is God” is used as an adjective to predicate divinity or deity, not identity. Chapter 24 says that each
Person is a person, where by “x is a person” Hasker means “x is a center or
subject of consciousness, knowledge, will, love, and action” (193, 196–198;
see also 22n15, 256, and Chapter 3 passim). Chapter 25 describes the communion of the Persons while Chapter 26 defends the eternal generation
of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Hasker recognizes that
communion, generation, and procession cannot suffice for the needed
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“oneness” in an adequate solution to the three-in-oneness problem. For
that, we discover in Chapter 27, we need Hasker’s core view, which we
might naturally call
Core. “the three Persons share a single concrete nature, a single trope
of deity” (227).
Since, according to Hasker, it is “highly plausible” to “equate” the divine
nature/trope with the “divine mind/soul” (236, 243), and since on page 257
he adds “a single mental substance” to the equation as well, he “models”
(257) his core view in these words, although the label is mine:
Support. The divine nature/trope or divine mind/soul or single mental substance “support[s] simultaneously three distinct lives, the lives
belonging to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit” (236, my
emphasis).
He defends Support’s “conceptual coherence” with split-brain and multiple personality data (231–236).
As Chapter 28 begins, Hasker expresses satisfaction with his “strong
case” for the coherence of his first model, but he shouldn’t. That’s because, among other things, few of his peers, if any, will understand what
he means by “support.” At some level, he is aware of the problem since
he seeks “a more precise account of the relationship between the persons
and the divine nature than is provided by the loosely defined ‘support’
relation” (237). However, the problem is more acute than Hasker acknowledges since nowhere does he define it. He says only that “the term is used
in the ordinary sense in which we can say that the human body/mind/
soul . . . ‘supports’ the continuing conscious life of a human being” (228).
This is no definition, not even a “loose” one; nor is there any such thing
as “the ordinary sense” of the term “supports” that is used to say that
“the human body/mind/soul supports the continuing conscious life of a
human being.” Thus, the primary explanatory relation posited by the first
model is an explanatory surd.
Fortunately, he ditches “the support relation,” replacing it with the
transitive, asymmetrical, irreflexive constitution relation (245), which he
initially defines in such a way that x constitutes y only if x is spatially coincident with y and it is possible for x to exist without y, two implications he
wants to avoid for theological reasons, along with another. The final definition, which the reader must piece together for herself (241–243), is this:
x constitutes y at time t if and only if
(i) x is absolutely distinct from y;
(ii) x and y have all their parts in common at t;
(iii) x is in G-favorable circumstances at t;
(iv) necessarily, for any x, if x is of primary kind F at t and x is in Gfavorable circumstances at t, then there is a y such that y is of primary kind G at t and y has all of its parts in common with x at t;
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(v) it is (conceptually, but not necessarily metaphysically) possible
for x to exist at t but for there to be no y at t that has all of its parts
in common with x.
Hasker tells us that (ii) “should suffice to secure the needed ‘closeness’ between x and y” that had been secured by spatial coincidence in the initial
definition, and that “if, as is commonly thought, souls are metaphysically
simple, then neither x nor y will have ‘proper parts’; what they share,
then, will be only their single ‘improper part,’ which is the soul in its entirety” (243).
Hasker clarifies two concepts in his definition: primary kind and Gfavorable circumstances. The primary kind of a thing, he says, supplies the
answer to the question, “What most fundamentally is it”? Hasker has no
theory of primary kinds but, quoting Lynne Rudder Baker, on whom he
relies heavily, he says that “If x constitutes y, then y has whole classes
of causal properties that x would not have had if x had not constituted
anything” (240). For example, “a cat has innumerable causal properties
that would not be possessed by a heap of cat tissue, were that heap not
to constitute a cat” (240). The G-favorable circumstances are “precisely the
circumstances in which an object [x] of primary kind F must find itself at
a given time in order to constitute an object of kind G at that time,” where
the circumstances may include features either intrinsic or extrinsic to x
(241). For example, if x is of the primary kind mass of cat tissue and y is of
the primary kind felis catus and x constitutes y, then x “does so in virtue of
certain circumstances in which x finds itself; lacking those circumstances,
x might [conceptually “might”] exist without constituting anything” (241).
Hasker then applies his definition to the subject matter of the book. For
F in the schema, he tells us to substitute divine mind/soul or concrete divine
nature/trope or single mental substance; for G, substitute divine trinitarian person; and for G-favorable circumstances, substitute “when [the divine mind/
soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single mental substance] sustains
simultaneously three divine life-streams, each life-stream including cognitive,
affective, and volitional states” (243, his emphasis). He continues: “Since
in fact [the divine mind/soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single
mental substance] does sustain three life-streams simultaneously, there are
exactly three divine persons” (243, my emphasis). Thus we have Hasker’s
second model, which we might label
Sustain. The divine mind/soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single
mental substance constitutes each of the Father, and the Son, and the
Holy Spirit when it “sustains simultaneously three divine life-streams, each
life-stream including cognitive, affective, and volitional states.”
Hasker beams: “all is as it should be” (243). But clearly: not all is as it
should be. Among other things, “sustains” is at least as undefined as
“supports,” and so the critical G-favorable circumstances under which the
divine mind/soul, etc. is supposed to constitute each of the Persons are
simply unintelligible.
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We might well wonder where God is in all this. Chapter 29 answers
with a “grammar of the Trinity” that specifies “three different and distinctive uses of this word [“God”] in the vicinity of trinitarian doctrine” (246):
(i) to refer to “Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament, who was known to
Jesus as Father” (246–247), (ii) to predicate divinity or deity of each of the
Persons (247–249), and (iii) to refer to “the Trinity as a whole” (249–250),
which, according to Hasker, is absolutely identical with either a composite
object distinct from the Persons who are its proper parts (144, 198, 243), or
a maximally tight-knit “community of persons” (196, 249, 258). Chapter 30
summarizes the book in three pages.
Aside from my concerns about the intelligibility of “supports” and
“sustains,” I have several other concerns. For example, what is it, exactly,
that does the constituting? The options on offer—(i) divine mind/soul, (ii)
concrete divine nature or trope, and (iii) single mental substance—do not
fall into the same category, despite Hasker’s “equation,” and the models
may well have different implications, some welcome, some not, depending on which we opt for. Another example: for each option, when it satisfies Hasker’s conditions for constituting something else, how is it, exactly,
that the result is a person, as opposed to, say, a personality? A third: even
if the result is a person, what is it about the constituter in virtue of which
a constituted Person is divine? For, on the one hand, if the constituter is
itself omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc., and if it is
distinct from each of the constituted Persons, each of whom is distinct
from the other and also omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc., don’t we have four divine beings on our inventory? On the other
hand, if the constituter is itself neither omnipotent, omniscient, morally
perfect, nor uncreated, etc., then, even if it does “support” or “sustain”
a stream of “cognitive, affective, and volitional states,” thereby resulting
in a constituted Person, in virtue of what, exactly, is that Person omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc.? A fourth concern: if
one constituted divine Person is absolutely distinct from a second constituted divine Person, then there are at least two divine Persons. But if
there are at least two divine Persons, why aren’t there at least two divine
beings? So what if there’s just one trope of divinity. On Hasker’s view, we
don’t count divine beings by tropes; we count them by absolute identity.
Thus, wouldn’t a count of two divine persons also be a count of two divine beings? A fifth concern: why aren’t there three numerically distinct
Persons that are qualitatively indistinguishable? What is it about (a) the
constituting mind/soul/nature/trope/substance, or (b) the three distinct
life-streams of “cognitive, affective, and volitional states,” or (c) the former’s supporting or sustaining the latter, in virtue of which each constituted Person is qualitatively different from each other constituted Person?
Presumably, the answer lies in some qualitative difference in the distinct
life-streams of mental states, which pushes the question back a step: why
aren’t there three numerically distinct life-streams of qualitatively indistinguishable mental states? What is it about (a), (b), and (c) in virtue
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of which each life-stream is qualitatively distinguished from each other
life-stream?
Unfortunately, space does not permit me to pursue these concerns.
Rather, let me draw the reader’s attention to another concern, one that
begins with a simple question: what is monotheism? Whatever else we
might say in answer to this question, surely we can agree on this much:
1. Monotheism implies that there is only one God.
There are not two Gods, three Gods, or four Gods. There is just one God,
exactly one. In this connection, note that “God” is used as a count noun
by monotheists, a use screechingly absent from Hasker’s list of three permitted uses (246–250), a use only grudgingly acknowledged in a footnote
as “consistent” with his three (251n6). Christians should be clear with
Hasker: There are not three Gods. There is only one God. Two statements more
integral to the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be found and both use “God”
as a count noun.
We might pause to inquire into the nature of this being exactly one of
which exists, according to monotheism. The monotheist will answer that
a God—with an honorific capital “G” befitting its referent—is the kind
of thing that instantiates the divine nature. As is well known, monotheists disagree about what properties that nature involves, but let’s suppose
Hasker is right: it involves omnipotence or almightiness, omniscience,
moral perfection, uncreatedness, etc. (247, 256). Thus, given our supposition, a God is omnipotent or almighty, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc.
Back to the main thread, a little logic tells us two things:
2. Necessarily, if there is only one God, then there is at least one God.
3. Necessarily, if there is at least one God, then there is a God.
It follows that
4. Monotheism implies that there is a God (from 1–3).
Some Christians hesitate when they see or hear “a God” in discussions
such as ours. That’s unfortunate. For, like it or not, monotheists—and
Christians too, for every Christian is a monotheist—have a God on their
hands, and a magnificent God at that, a God worthy of our total devotion.
So much for monotheism; now let’s turn to Hasker.
According to Hasker, “it is entirely unacceptable to describe each—or
indeed any—of the trinitarian Persons as ‘a God’” (190). That’s because—
given his philosophical commitments, which are optional for trinitarians—
if he deemed it acceptable, then he would have to say: “If each Person is
‘a God,’ and each is distinct from each other Person, then we have at least
three Gods” (190). So, to avoid three Gods, Hasker insists that
5. The Father is not a God, the Son is not a God, and the Holy Spirit is
not a God.
But, according to Hasker,
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6. God is not a person,
since God—whether a composite or community of the Persons—is not a
subject of consciousness, knowledge, will, love, and action, and so fails to
satisfy Hasker’s definition of “x is a person.” Furthermore, since nothing
can instantiate the divine nature, and thereby know, will, love, act, and
exhibit consciousness unless it is a person, it follows that
7. Necessarily, for any x, if x is a God, then x is a person.
Therefore, on Hasker’s view,
8. God is not a God (from 6 and 7),
and thus
9. Neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, nor God is a
God (from 5 and 8).
But we Christians affirm that
10. Necessarily, if there is a God, then the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, or God is a God.
That’s because, by our lights, no one else could possibly fit the bill; not
Beelzebub, not Balaam, not Beelzebul, not Barabbas, not anyone. It follows
that, on Hasker’s view,
11. It is false that there is a God (from 9 and 10).
Thus, we arrive at the denial of monotheism (from 4 and 11).
How will Hasker respond to this argument?
Well, if the past reliably indicates the future, he will first denunciate
me for defining “monotheism” so that it is incompatible with the doctrine
of the Trinity (as he does on page 198). But I’ve done no such thing, not
least because I haven’t defined anything. I have stated that monotheism
implies that there is only one God—a statement Hasker says he believes:
“If it can’t be maintained that there is only one God, then the claim to be
monotheistic will have to be given up” (195)—and I have deduced that
there is a God from that statement by deploying two logical truths (2 and
3). Moreover, I have accurately represented the relevant portion of Hasker’s trinitarianism (5 and 6) and I have expressed a necessary truth and
the mind of Christians (7 and 10); otherwise, I have drawn demonstrably
valid inferences in the logical system that Hasker himself endorses.
Second, he will declare me a unitarian (as he does on page 198). But
I have said nothing that implies that “God is a single person,” a claim
Hasker misattributes to me four times (145, 197, 198, 230), as though a
monotheistic once or even a trinitarian thrice were not enough. By my
lights, a freighter filled with philosophy sits between the trinitarian “God
is a person” and the unitarian “God is a single person,” philosophy that’s
optional for Christians, and so we must not simply assume that anyone
who affirms the former must affirm the latter.
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Third, he will decry my “tendency to treat classic theological texts and
expressions as if they were formulas in symbolic logic” (as he does on
page 197). Here, I’m afraid, Hasker has some explaining to do. For in the
study of mine to which he refers, I treat Bill Craig’s work on the Trinity. As
for my “formulas in symbolic logic,” I plead guilty as charged. My only
defense is that I thought we were doing analytic theology.
On a more serious note, we can access the substantive issue on pages
196–198—which is whether or not God is a person and thus can, inter alia,
perform intentional acts—through a little argument:
12. God = the Trinity.
13. The Trinity never performs intentional acts.
14. So, God never performs intentional acts. (from 12 and 13)
Hasker bristles at (14), but how can he deny it? After all, he repeatedly affirms (12), where what, by his lights, is rigidly designated by the singular
terms flanking “=” fails to answer to his own definition of “x is a person.”
Moreover, the argument is formally valid given Leibniz’s Law, which he
also affirms. That leaves (13). What should we say about it? Hasker tells us
that we should say two things:
(i) The Trinity performs intentional acts in the way in which “groups of
agents . . . are said to perform intentional acts in virtue of such acts
being performed by their members,”
and
(ii) The Trinity performs intentional acts, alright; but when we use those
words, we use them analogically, not strictly and literally (197).
As for (i), we might well ask: should we say “groups of agents perform
intentional acts in virtue of such acts being performed by their members”
because that sentence is true, strictly and literally? If Hasker answers “yes,”
then we rightly expect him to illuminate us on how it is, exactly, that a
group of agents, whether a composite or community, performs an intentional act, strictly and literally, in virtue of its members performing it, despite the fact that, strictly and literally, it fails to satisfy his definition of “x
is a person,” and so, strictly and literally, it cannot intend anything. And,
of course, we need more than that. For in the case of God (= the Trinity),
we also rightly expect Hasker to illuminate us on how, exactly, a group
of persons, whether a composite or community, can, strictly and literally,
perceive, know, desire, love, and be conscious, even though, strictly and
literally, it is not the subject of perception, knowledge, desire, love and
consciousness. Hasker, however, attempts no such illumination. I take this
to be sufficient evidence of the fact that he forsakes any account of the
truth of (i), spoken strictly and literally. So either (i) is off the table, or it
collapses into (ii).
As for (ii), he says that, although “groups of agents . . . are said to perform intentional acts,” they do not strictly and literally perform intentional
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acts; rather a group of agents is merely “regarded in some contexts, and
spoken of, as if it were a single person,” and so a group of agents is merely
“regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if it” performed intentional
acts, as if it had properties that only persons can have (249). The same goes
for the Trinity—that is, God. “[T]he Trinity [= God], while not literally a
person, can nevertheless be regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if
it were a single person,” and so the Trinity, that is, God, while strictly and
literally incapable of performing intentional acts and strictly and literally
incapable of perceiving, knowing, desiring, loving, and being conscious,
can nevertheless be regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if it were
capable of performing intentional acts, as if it were the subject of perception, knowledge, desire, love and consciousness (249).
Let’s dwell on this for a moment. According to Hasker, when we speak
strictly and literally, as metaphysicians aim to speak, God never created
anything; nor does God know anything, will anything, or love anyone; nor
is God conscious. Indeed, Hasker goes so far as to assert—with italicized
passion—that “God cannot refer to himself [sic?], or be referred to (‘strictly and
literally’) by others, using personal pronouns” (231). So, God is not a person
even in Peter van Inwagen’s minimal sense of the term (122n4). God lacks
a point of view.
I propose that we find a pithy way to capture Hasker’s position on this
matter. Let “x is a Chalmers zombie” mean, by definition, “x lacks consciousness”; and let “x is a Nagel zombie” mean, by definition, “x lacks
a point of view.” Then Hasker’s God is a Chalmers-Nagel zombie. But at
least a Chalmers-Nagel zombie can perceive, believe, desire, will, and act.
Not so Hasker’s God. Hasker’s God is much, much worse off mentally
than a Chalmers-Nagel zombie. Let “x is a Hasker zombie” mean, by definition, “x is a Chalmers-Nagel zombie and x otherwise lacks mentality.”
Then it is more accurate to say that Hasker’s God is a Hasker zombie. Not
a Hollywood zombie, not a Haitian zombie. A Hasker zombie.
So God is a Hasker zombie. Nevertheless, Hasker reassures us, it is
still “more accurate” to speak as if God is a person, as if it can perform
intentional acts, as if it knows, wills, loves, exhibits consciousness, and
has a point of view. For, after all, writes Hasker, consider the alternative:
“Would it be more accurate to describe the Trinity [= God] as powerless?
When in fact the three Persons together exercise a single, transcendent
power that can never be in conflict with itself? Or that the Trinity [= God]
is ignorant, when each of the three Persons knows everything that exists
to be known?” (249) Good question: would it? Hasker wants us to answer
“No, it would not; it would be more accurate to describe God as omnipotent and omniscient than powerless and ignorant.” But, as we’ve seen,
on his view, God [= the Trinity] really is a Hasker zombie, in which case it
would be much more accurate to describe God as powerless and ignorant
than as omnipotent and omniscient.
How could Hasker be so wrong about the implications of his view? My
hypothesis is that he does not have in mind accuracy simpliciter, where a
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statement is accurate simpliciter if and only if what it claims to be the case
really is the case. My hypothesis is that he has in mind another sort of accuracy, what we might call “as-ifery accuracy.” If my hypothesis is correct,
then we need to know, exactly, what this quality is and we need a metric
for non-arbitrarily assigning more or less of it to statements. Only then can
we begin to understand how it can be that it is more as-ifery accurate to describe God as omnipotent and omniscient instead of powerless and ignorant when we know for a fact that it is more accurate simpliciter to describe
God as powerless and ignorant instead of omnipotent and omniscient.
Christian analytic theology is a wonderful enterprise. For, among other
things, Christian analytic theologians allow us to see more starkly than
ever what is at stake in our different attempts to understand the great
doctrines of the Church. This is certainly true of William Hasker’s metaphysics of the Trinity. As I come away from my study of his book, two
questions loom large for me. First, are we Christian analytic theologians
going to follow the one we profess as our Lord and stand up and count
ourselves as full-blooded monotheists, insisting that our metaphysics,
logic, and philosophy more generally get in line with our profession?
Yes, it is difficult to define “monotheism”; but we don’t need a definition
to know that whatever else monotheism involves, it implies that there is
only one God, and so it implies that there is a God. Second, is it morally
permissible for Christian analytic theologians—or Christian intellectuals
and leaders more generally—to adopt as-ifery in their most fundamental
theorizing about the nature of God? We might approach the second question through reflection on the Church’s mission, no small part of which is
expressed by the Great Commission. In this connection, let me phrase the
question in a conspicuously evangelical way: can we Christians in good
faith evangelize with “God loves you and offers a wonderful plan for your
life” when we think it would be more accurate simpliciter to say “God does
not love you and offers no plan for your life, much less a wonderful one.
But don’t take it personally. God can’t love or offer anything to anyone”?

Beyond the Control of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract
Objects, ed. Paul M. Gould. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. 209
pages. $25.99 (paperback)
R. T. MULLINS, University of Notre Dame
Are you the sort of philosopher who prefers desert landscapes, or lush
forests? Would you gladly live in a world that contained the Platonic
heavens, or would you rather decry the heavens and do without? Where
pp. 115–121
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